fig 1 (top left) Ruskin: The Vine Angle; depicting the Drunkeness of Noah, 1869
fig 2 (bottom left) Ruskin: The Vine, Free and in Service
fig 3 (right) Ruskin: Angle of the Façade, St Marks, undated.
Ross Jenner
Masters And Slaves, Ornament And The Particular
The Stones Of Venice

“in several cases, the sculptor has shown the undersides of the leaves turned boldly to the light, and has literally
carved every rib and vein upon them, in relief; not merely the main ribs which sustain the lobes of the leaf, and
actually project in nature, but the irregular and sinuous veins which chequer the membranous tissues between them,
and which the sculptor has represented conventionally as relieved like the others, in order to give the vine-leaf its
peculiar tassellated effect upon the eye”

(John Ruskin, The Stones Of Venice, 10 §xxxvii)

“all the leaves and tendrils and fruit that make up a grape vine”

(Jorge Luis Borges, ‘Funes the Memorious,’ Labyrinths)

1.

Le Corbusier revolted “against our enforced servitude to the abnormal...” Attention to “type-needs,”
themselves typified by the filing cabinet were to overcome this: “The objects of utility in our lives” he
argued “have freed the slaves of a former age. They are in fact themselves slaves, menials servants.
Do you want them as your soul-mates?”¹ Buckminster Fuller’s “energy slaves” and Louis Kahn’s
“served” and “servant” division of spatial function continued the theme. The ancient Telemones,
Caryatids and Persian captives, Michelangelo’s suffering Captives, his Bound - and Dying Slaves,
Serlio’s bound and braided Hermis and beyond², provided classical ornament with a long-standing
set of tropes involving burden, binding, entanglement, and enslavement. Such figures would appear
to be trophies of triumph and the celebration of lordship. Slaves have but one function: to serve, to
bear.³ Emblems of labour, they are adornments. Paradoxically it is the superfluity beyond service, the
uselessness, the very freedom from work, which is both the definition and peculiar work of ornament.

In Ruskin’s architectural thought, so often condescendingly treated as being both naively
unhistorical and merely concerned with ornament,⁴ it was the addition of this single element of the
unnecessary to the construction which defined architecture itself: a stone motif of binding, a cable
moulding.⁵ “Ornamentation” he wrote “is the principal part of architecture”⁶ If, however, he
regarded as inadmissable the representation of human work as such⁷, it was by the trait of work in the
characteristic singularity of its mark that the virtue, or otherwise, of ornament was to be discerned.
But work is different from business, from whose premises ornament was to be kept apart.⁸

Consciousness of work was a value in itself.⁹ It was a theory of bodily trace and individuation
which functionalist thinking, would supercede in the abstraction of a moving trace in space, in
ergonomics and in modular standardization, to form an architecture, in Musil’s words, ohne
Eigenschaften, without qualities. Work for Ruskin was the imprint, the index sign of the body,
subjugated or emancipated.

What counts in architecture for Ruskin is not composition or structure, volume or breadth,
where one can scarcely speak of ornament and detail, but the surface facing, and its interplay with its
own depth. In Venice, he finds the first broad characteristic of St. Mark’s is that of “incrustation,” the
use of revetment, or stone “sheeting.” What lies behind this “wall-veil”, the inner structure is of no
concern, only “the precious film” (Ruskin, 10.101) exquisitely stained and the spoils and trophies of
forty, which are riveted to it.¹¹ There is nothing behind the curtain. Surface is depth. It has all the
depths of a painting, a page: Ruskin no sooner likens stone to paper (his own ground as writer), to its
pulping and pressing processes, than out of it emerges a writing, a legend, a history, a politics of
stone¹². The surface¹³ is the crucial plane where the formative forces and “the historical language of
stones”¹⁴ encounter the workman’s hand - and is in turn worked on by weather and illumination¹⁶.
Here nature’s work and man’s work touch. The value of an ornament or building rests in the the
writing, the character, the (im)print it bears of living labour, of human struggle.

Only what is opaque and matt is able to sustain the marks and colours of distinction, the
Curtain Wall cannot bear the individual: “you can never have any noble architecture in transparent
or lustrous glass or enamel” (Ruskin, 9 appendix 17 and n 15) - Ruskin’s grounds for denying any
future to the mode of the shiny tense transparent meniscus, "the bubble", which is Crystal Palace. It is here at Crystal Palace in the wake of the great wave of its planetary expansion and colonization that Europe cedes to the 'other', the strange, the foreign, the extraneous. It appropriates it, reconstructing its identity; it liberates itself from the world. Both Owen Jones and Gottfried Semper visited Crystal Palace. Jones would be the first to introduce Maori tattooing seen there (the word itself borrowed from Tahiti by Captain Cook) into his encyclopaedic Grammar of Ornament. Tattooing is at issue in Semper and will still be so in Reigl's Stilfragen in 1893. But character and particularity cut two ways: both as mark of individual identity and as denial of it. Fingerprint, handwriting, modus operandi all classify criminality. Character in its etymological sense means "branding", as stigma means "tattoo." It would be up to Adolf Loos to establish the conjunction of ornament and particularity with criminality.

2.

Ruskin reads mastery and slavery in the very surface and patterns of material. The direct visual pleasure of Arabic woven or perforated designs, for example, he sees as not only a matter of our absorption in the maze of the texture but it is also "increased and solemnized by some dim feeling of the setting forth by such symbols, of the intricacy and alternative rise and fall, subjection and supremacy of human fortune." (Ruskin, 10.163) In a willfully anti-classical mode he defines what he calls three "orders," which are based on three possible configurations of mastery and servility, and manifested historically in three phases. They underpin the entire thesis of The Stones. Ruskin undoubtedly speaks with a view to contemporary politics, but this discourse of mastery and slavery has not been examined on its own terms.

We have, then, three orders of ornament, classed according to the degrees of correspondence of the executive and conceiptive minds. We have servile ornament, in which the executive is absolutely subjected to the inventive, - the ornament of the great Eastern nations, more especially Hamite, and all pre-Christian, yet thoroughly noble in its submissiveness. Then we have the mediaeval system, in which the mind of the inferior workman is recognised, and has full room for action, but guided and ennobled by the ruling mind. This is the truly Christian and only perfect system. Finally, we have ornaments expressing the endeavour to equalise the executive and inventive, - endeavour which is Renaissance and revolutionary, and destructive of all noble architecture. (Ruskin, 9.291)

This is all elaborated in much greater detail in "The Nature of Gothic" and the enormously enlarged treatment of one of its categories, the Grotesque, with which he wrestles with in the third book.

In the first phase, characteristic of Assyria and Egypt, on the one hand, and on the other of Greece, where the "master-workman was far advanced in knowledge and power" above the others, nevertheless, "the workman was, in both systems a slave." (Ruskin, 10.189) This is "Servile ornament in which the execution or power of the inferior workman is entirely subjected to the intellect of the higher." (Ruskin, 10.188)

In the second, the "constitutional" or "subordinate" phase, the individual value of the soul is recognised, fallenness and powerlessness admitted, imperfection and unworthiness confessed, obedience is now rendered to higher powers. Out of the labour of inferior minds and imperfect fragments a greater whole is created. Constitutional ornament, is where "the executive inferior power is, to a certain point, emancipated and independent, having a will of its own, yet confessing its inferiority and rendering obedience to higher powers." (Ruskin, 10.190)

In the third: "revolutionary" or "insubordinate" phase no executive inferiority or imperfection is admitted at all, the workman has become as good as, if not, the master, but at the cost of the loss of his own original power which is defeated by abstract learning. Similarly in "pride of science" the artist becomes "encumbered with useless knowledge" (Ruskin, 11.55) and the abstract invention of ideas is regarded as more important than the narration of fact in religious painting. (Ruskin, 10.126) The classical system of ornament is for Ruskin already something mechanistic. (Ruskin, 11 §xc) To seek the mechanical reproducibility of its components simply doubles the enslavement unless imperfection is accepted.

For since the architect, whom we will suppose capable of doing all in perfection, cannot execute the whole with his own hands, he must either make slaves of his workmen in the old Greek, and present English fashion, and level his work to a slave's capacities, which is to degrade it; or else he must take his workmen as he finds them, and let them show their weaknesses together with their strength, which will involve the Gothic imperfection, but render the whole
work as noble as the intellect of the age can make it. (Ruskin, 10.202)

But the modern English have chosen “to make men tools and the tools of tools.” This enslavement of souls to “trivial perfection” is the ultimate slavery,

a thousand times more bitter and more degrading than that of the scourged African or Helot Greek. Men may be beaten chained, tormented, yoked like cattle, slaughtered like summer flies, and yet remain in one sense and the best sense free. But to smother their souls within them, to blight and hew into rotting pollards the sucking branches of their human intelligence, to make the flesh and skin which, after the worms work on it, is to see God, into leathern thongs to yoke machinery with - this is to be slave-masters indeed. (Ruskin, 10.192-3)

It is verily this degradation of the operative into a machine, which, more than any other evil of the times, is leading the mass of the nations everywhere into vain, incoherent, destructive struggling for a freedom of which they cannot explain the nature to themselves. It is not that men are ill-fed, but that they have no pleasure in the work by which they make their bread, and therefore look to wealth as the only means of pleasure. (Ruskin, 10.194)

In probably the most well-known part of the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807, Hegel had presented a dialectic of domination and servitude which is perhaps worth comparing, since, for both Ruskin and Hegel, mastery proves to be a dead-end, and a viable form of subordination alone offers the way to the experience of independence and the formation of individuality in work.

The relation between master and slave arises in Hegel from the struggle for recognition. The master is the actual realization of consciousness for-itself who requires the mediation of another consciousness to achieve independent being and join with the world of things in general. Domination is inherently contradictory: the master is master only because he is recognized by the slave, his autonomy depends on the mediation of another self-consciousness, the slave’s. The slave in the encounter between them retreated in the face of death - “the absolute master”. He discovers mortality, the non-being of his being, and trembles in every fibre of his being. Everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. Preferring servitude to liberty in death he is the slave less of the master than of life: “That is the yoke from which he has been unable to free himself through struggle and why he has shown himself to be dependent, having his independence in thingness.”

Lordship, on the other hand “consists in showing that it is unfettered to determinate existence, that it is not bound at all by the particularity everywhere characteristic of existence as such, and is not tied up with life”. The master placed himself above life, willing to lose it for the sake of recognition. The master relates only through the slave to independent being, to life, to things. He can enjoy things, negate them and so affirm himself in immediate self-certainty. He has no concept of the independence of the being of life nor of the resistance of the world to what he wants. But the slave knows only the resistance of life to desire and so cannot deny this world. His desire encounters the resistance of the real, and he is only able to elaborate things, to work on them. His lot is servile labour, arranging the world so that the master can negate it by enjoyment and consumption. The slave transforms the world in production, “delayed enjoyment”. The slave recognizes himself as slave, and this slave-consciousness in moving from fear and anguish, to service, to labour will form the truth of self-consciousness. Consciousness thus disciplines itself in service of the master and detaches itself from natural existence.

Genuine independence, however, can only be attained when work transforms servitude into mastery, rendering the world of things adequate to desire. The slave shapes himself by shaping things, and so imprints the form of self-consciousness on being. He finds himself in the product of his work. The master attains only a transitory enjoyment, but the slave through work is able to contemplate independent being as well as himself. Consciousness, in the guise of the worker, comes to see its own independence in the independent being of the object: “In fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. The shape does not become something other than himself through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape that is his pure being-for-self, which in this externality is seen by him to be the truth.” (Hegel, Phenomenology p 118)

The inscription of human labour, the values of “life,” the idea of creative expressivity is common to both writers and will become central to the problematic of decorative art. Both understand work as a move from slavishness and as a process by which individuation occurs: the particular arises only in work, consciousness only from the particular.
Work...is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now in the work outside of it acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being of the object its own independence. (Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 118)

Where Hegel's concern is the dialectical achievement of universality and self-consciousness, Ruskin's is (even to the extent of valorizing a certain savagery, cruelty and ignorance) the achievement of the particular, making it visible:

Is there, then, nothing to be done by man's art? Have we only to copy; and again copy; for ever, the imagery of the universe? Not so. We have work to do upon it; there is not any one of us so simple, nor so feeble, but he has work to do upon it. But the work is not to improve, but to explain. This infinite universe is unfathomable, inconceivable, in its whole; every human creature must slowly spell out, and long contemplate, such part of it as may be possible for him to reach; then set forth what he has learnt of it for those beneath him extricating it from infinity, as one gathers a violet out of grass; one does not improve either violet or grass in gathering it, but one makes the flower visible. (Ruskin, 9.410 §5)

The categories of "The Nature of Gothic": Savageness, Changefulness, Naturalism, Grotesqueness, Rigidity, and Redundance show work as means and expression of such particularity. Approximately six years later in *The Elements of Drawing* he would be haunted by an extraordinary nightmare:

We have to show the individual character and liberty of the separate leaves, clouds or rocks. And herein the great masters separate themselves finally from the inferior one... Now although both these expressions of government and individuality are essential to a masterly work, the individuality is the more essential, and the more difficult of attainment... It is a lamentable and unnatural thing to see a number of men subject to no government, actuated by no ruling principle, and associated by no common affection; but it would be more lamentable thing still, were it possible, to see a number of men so oppressed into assimilation as to have no more any individual hope or character, no differences in aim, no dissimilarities of passion, no irregularities of judgement... a society in which every soul would be as the syllable of a stammerer instead of the word of a speaker, in which every man would walk as in a frightful dream, seeing specters of himself, in everlasting multiplication, gliding helplessly around him in speechless darkness. Therefore it is that perpetual difference, play and change in groups of form are more essential to them than their being subdued by some great gathering law... (Ruskin *Elements of Drawing*, II.133)

3.

For Ruskin ornament is not only site-specific it must know its place: "Every one of its qualities has reference to its place and use; and it is fitted for its service by what would be faults and deficiencies if it had no especial duty. Ornament, the servant, is often formal, where sculpture, the master, would have been free; the servant is often silent where the master would have been eloquent; or hurried, where the master would have been serene." (Ruskin, 9.284) To be ornamental is to be subservient:

As an architect, therefore, you are modestly to measure your capacity of governing ornament. Remember its essence, - its being ornament at all, consists in being governed. Lose your authority over it, let it command you, or lead you, or dictate to you in any wise, and it is an offence, an incumbrance, and a dishonour. (Ruskin, 10.308)

One of the greatest problems of ornament is the dynamic of limitation and excess from which emerges its tendency to proliferate and threaten the structural underpinning of what it is meant to embellish. It is a question of restraint, or "submission" (Ruskin, 9 §xxxii) or "subordination" to a greater, simpler and more powerful order or class (Ruskin, p §xxvi). Removal of ornament is not at issue: "Whatever has nothing to do, whatever could go without being missed, is not ornament, it is deformity and encumbrance. Away with it." (Ruskin, 9 §xxxiv) Ruskin's fascinating and characteristic problematic, is that, having made ornament the *touchstone* of architecture, what should be peripheral and backgrounded is given both focal emphasis and all the seriousness of the foreground. His political programme is not at all democratic: it will neither allow nor have any intention of allowing ornament, the servant, to become master, though such margins cannot be transgressed every effort short of this must be made to valorise the servant's work. Viewed in Hegelian terms, is ornament the slave who will become through work a master, or already master, hence otiose, superfluous, and incapable of attending to the particular? The line must be drawn. But where?

How far this subordination is in different situations to be expressed, or how far it may be surrendered, and ornament the servant, be permitted to have independent will; and by what means the subordination is best to be expressed when it is required, are by far the most difficult questions I have ever tried to work out respecting any branch of art... (Ruskin, 9.285)
fig 3 (top) Cornice and Capitals of St. Mark’s
fig 4 (bottom left) Leafage of the Vine Angle
fig 3 (bottom right) The Fig-Tree Angle of the Ducal Palace
The very concepts of centre and hierarchy in ornament are rendered difficult. The human body is excluded from it (being reserved for the “master”, sculpture), at the symbolic level of subject matter, its representation must be alongside the quadrupeds (Ruskin, 9.281) as part of Creation. The body in any other guise or (what once probably amounted to the same) the Orders must be banished from a central position, being mere pagan forms of self-celebration. The “proper material of ornament” offered (Ruskin, 9.265-266) is something between a programme for a museum and the outline for an encyclopedia of natural history. This excess of centre, its very multidinousness, amounts to a denial of centrality by leaving no room for margins. Nor is there any space between the subjects of ornament found in man’s works and God’s (Creation) to fit entire areas of iconography: such as the representation of the celestial city, the body of Christ, or the cruciform plan. The motif which Ruskin once described as the “Distinctive test” of Gothic: the trefoil arch hardly approximates it.

The nearest ornament comes to being conceived of as background embellishment is in the discussion of the Romanesque striped wall but such a conception can hardly be said to exist, when every moulding tells a story and is apparently intended to form part of a cross-referenced catalogue of types. Above all the insistently readings in naturalistic terms, despite Ruskin’s emphasis on the need to abstract, conspire always to break down any distinction between fine art and decorative art. Though ornament implies stylisation and repetition which is the diminishment of individuation for Ruskin it offers the greatest potential for concentration on the particle and the particular. As in Pre-Raphaelite painting every detail is elaborated to its highest pitch of specificity. This acute observation of the particular, the author as exegete of the world, leads not only to acceptance and valorisation of heterogeneity, the eclectic character of Venetian ornament (St Marks as shrine “at which to dedicate the splendour of the miscellaneous spoil than the organised expression of any fixed architectural law” (Ruskin, 10.97)), Venice as city of fragments, but also to the insistence that all ornament be treated and placed with reference to the physical circumstances of the spectator rather than any abstract or absolute schema. For Ruskin the decorative arts differ from the other arts not in value but only in that they are site-specific. In fact the portability of the art work may be considered a degradation (Ruskin, 16.320-21).

The tendency to particularisation is most evident at St Marks, all of which Ruskin confesses he would like to draw “stone by stone, to eat it up in my mind, touch by touch” (Ruskin, 10.xxxvi) Here, without any general description of the façade as a whole, without sections, plan, aerial view, perspectives from within or without, he offers only a detail, in fact in illustration (Ruskin, 10.115 (facing)), a fragment of a detail such that our “decision of the respective merits of modern and of Byzantine architecture may be allowed to rest on this fragment of St. Marks alone” (Ruskin, 10.115-117). After some general account of the Doge’s Palace, its successive transformations and relations to Venetian history we find “We are at liberty to examine some of the details of the Ducal Palace...” which in fact since every capital is different form the bulk of his treatment of the building. The most notable of these is the “Vine Angle” portraying the drunkenness of Noah, filled with minute description of the “extreme refinement” of the leafage, so delicate that half the stems are now broken, where every carved rib and vein on the undersides of the leaves exposed to light is noted.

The explanation (Garrigan, p 159) of this impulse towards detail and fragment as arising from the need to rebuild in his imagination a world he saw falling into ruins around him is only partially satisfactory. There is a void and “the English School of landscape, culminating in Turner, is in reality nothing else than a healthy effort to fill the void which the destruction of Gothic architecture has left.” (Ruskin, 11.225) Perhaps ultimately such fragmentation resists recomposition. Instead detail is valued in and for itself, within an aesthetics and (if the two can be distinguished here) an ethics of particularity.

For both Ruskin and Hegel Gothic architecture is ‘centrally’ concerned with particularization and the non-finite. For both the question of individuation arises with Christian art. Ruskin notes:

We have with Christianity recognised the individual value of every soul; and there is no intelligence so feeble but that a single ray may in some sort contribute to the general light. This is the glory of Gothic architecture, that every jot and title, every point and niche of it, affords room, fuel, and focus for individual fire.
For Hegel, however, in Romantic art (that is, in his own terminology, art since Christianity) consciousness, free from external obligations reflects on itself, producing a disequilibrium where the representation of exterior phenomena does not go beyond the limits of ordinary and banal reality, and is not afraid of appropriating the real world in all its faults, its insufficiencies, contingent particulars and finished precision. Romantic art no longer aspires to reproduce life in a state of infinite serenity, to exteriorize the soul in incarnating it in a body. It turns its back on this summit of beauty and makes interiority participate in every accident of exterior formation. It carries subjectivity to the extreme and makes prosaic circumstances intervene. Gothic architecture is an “elevation above the finite.” It is “precisely where particularisation, diversity, and variety gain the the fullest scope.” The whole, however, is not allowed “to fall apart into mere trifles and accidental details.” 42 The totality will always remain in control.

Now since spirituality has withdrawn into itself out of the external world and immediate unity therewith, the sensuous externality of shape is for this reason accepted and represented, as in symbolic art as something inessential and transient; and the same is true of the subjective finite spirit and will, right down to the particularity and caprice of individuality, character, action, etc., of incident, plot, etc. The aspect of external existence is consigned to contingency and abandoned to the adventures devised by an imagination whose caprice can mirror what is present to it, exactly as it is, just as readily as it can jumble the shapes of the external world and distort them grotesquely. (Hegel, Aesthetics, II p 685)

Art, unlike philosophy, Hegel saw as no longer capable of surpassing the schism between subjectivity and objective reality, therefore as he notes in the introduction to Aesthetics it “is and remains for us from the point of view of its supreme destination, something of the past.” In this movement of universal consciousness, the self, the individual consciousness, like the particular, has value only as a moment in a global picture of sense. “The true is the all but the all does not coincide at all with the dimension of the self-conscious subject as such.”43 There is a gap. And before long the discovery that at the centre of the subject there is no subject, only an uninhabited spectral place: “our glassy essence,”44 become speaking void, in its vitreous clarity guarding an invisible Other. (Bodei, p 217)

Ruskin’s emphasis is on the particular, the “passionate admiration” of the inanimate object (Ruskin, 5.322)45. The highest art demands truth to nature, that is “showing the specific character of every kind of rock, every class of earth, every form of cloud, every species of herb and flower.”46 It is from here that his naturalism and his demand for “panegyric accuracy” springs, rather than a desire for perfect mimesis per se. Imperfection, incompleteness, independence, individuation do not await instant dialectical recovery. Finish, both as realization and surface, threatens to efface the particular and consciousness itself.

Above all demand no refinement of execution where there is no thought, for that is slave’s work, unredeemed (Ruskin, 10.199)

The glass bead maker typifies that. (Ruskin, 10.197-8) In fact the fault, the flaw is constitutional and the very means of individuation:

For as that resulted from a humility, which confessed the imperfection of the workman, so this naturalist portraiture is rendered more faithful by the humility which confesses the imperfection of the subject. (Ruskin, 10.234)

Let them show their weaknesses together with their strength which will involve the Gothic imperfection, but render the whole work as noble as the intellect of the age can make it (Ruskin 10.202)

In the works of man, those which are more perfect in their kind are always inferior to those which are, in their nature, liable to more faults and shortcomings. For the finer the nature, the more flaws it will show through the clearness of it, and it is a law of this universe, that the best things shall be seldomest seen in their best form. (Ruskin, 10.108-90)

And of all things that live there are certain irregularities and deficiencies which are not only signs of life but sources of beauty. No human face is exactly the same in its lines on each side, no leaf in its lobes, no branch in its symmetry. All admit irregularities as they imply change, and to banish imperfection is to destroy expression, to check exertion, to paralyze vitality. All things are literally better lovelier and more beloved for the imperfections which have been divinely appointed, that the law of human life may be Effort, and the law of human judgement, Mercy. (Ruskin, 10.204)

This valorisation of imperfection would the basis of Hopkins’ Pied Beauty:

All things counter, original, spare, strange;
Whatever is fickle, freckeled (who knows how?)
With swift, slow; sweet, sour; adazzle, dim;
fig 7 (top left) Cornices and Abaci
fig 8 (bottom left) Edge Decoration
fig 9 (right) Cornice Decoration
Ruskin sharply distinguishes this emphasis on the particular from the attitudes of Reynolds, for whom the whole beauty and grandeur of painting consisted in "being able to get above all singular forms, local customs, particularities and details of every kind." (Reynolds quoted in Christ, p. 7) The Earl of Shaftsbury had argued that the painter and poet "hate minuteness and are afraid of singularity, which would make their images or characters appear capricious and fantastical" (Shaftsbury quoted in Christ p. 7) But it is equally distinguished from the "laborious" finish of Dutch naturalism:

...and from these larger incidents he (the painter) may proceed into the most minute particulars, and lead the companion imagination to the veins of the leaves and the mosses on the trunk, and the shadows of the dead leaves upon the grass, but always multiplying thoughts, or subjects of thought, never working for the sake of realization. (Ruskin, II IV §xxvi)

Already with some of the earliest works of the Gothic revival, Walpole's Strawberry Hill, for example, there is a growing individuation granted to the exterior expression of each element of the house, which, since this differentiation can be related to commodity or purpose, is sometimes called "Picturesque utility." In Victorian architecture this is carried to its fullest extent. The passion for minutenae and detail, in The Modern Painters, in its digression, the Stones of Venice, and also in Pre-Raphaelite painting is perhaps a desperate attempt to enumerate a disperate world grown resistant to and withdrawn from human control. For Ruskin there are no longer the classic five orders, they are limitless. But if limitless, how to can any order be achieved? The compilation of particulars was the hope of ordering by saturation, a last attempt to find a universal order transcending that world's multitudinousness, its particularity; and to overcome the solipsism that threatens to engulf the particular subjectivity. Hence the lists, tabulations, the profiles, the families of capitals, convex and concave, Byzantine and Norman, etc, as a naturalist might compile. Ruskin praised Butterfield's All Saints in Margaret Street begun 1849 whose constuctional polychromy arises from a profusion of minerals collected, cut and polished into complex patterns, the stones were intended to reveal the glory of their creator's handiwork. The church is presented as sacred museum, while the museum Ruskin inspired at Oxford, where each of the pillars of the colonnades is made from a different stone, was a sort of secular cathedral. In the very moment when everything in nature was stridently proclaimed to reveal God in the detail, there dawned the frightening realisation that it did not, that detail revealed only blind and violent chance.

Darwin's theory displaced typological thought rendering the idea of species an artificial abstraction by denying the immutability it implied. Instead, since no two individuals are exactly the same and the variations between them are what propels the process of natural change, the variant, the unique, the particular became elevated as the very instrument of evolution. Ruskin, however, would reject the continuity and merging that such a theory implied:

Species are not innumerable: neither are they now connected by consistent gradation, they touch at certain points only; and even then are connected, when we examine them deeply, in a kind of reticulated way, not in chains, but in chequers; also, however connected, it is but by a touch of the extremities, as it were, and the characteristic form of the species is entirely individual. (Ruskin, 19.359)

Elsewhere chiaroscuro or dappling (Ruskin, 11.25) is opposed to the principle of gradation "for gradation is to colours what curvature is to lines, both expressing the law of gradual change and progress in the human soul itself" (Ruskin, 15.147) gradation being a principle of merging not distinction between things. Ruskin's much younger contemporary, Hopkins, with whom he bears comparison, would define two very similar modes of differentiation in nature: what he called 'diatonism', any difference between part and part which is abrupt, and 'chromatism' any change or difference which is sliding or transitional. He also tended to reject chromatism as associated with evolutionary development from shapeless slime without any notion of absolute types but simply momentary and accidental coagulations of matter developed without break from the species below, flux and continuity without fixed points.

5.

The sense of self is derived both from particularisation of the exterior world and deeper and deeper interiorization of consciousness. The inward turn of consciousness continues through the nineteenth century where privatization of the psyche is a distinctive element in the stage of self-consciousness.
which is modernism. Here the inward turning, arising from a sense of loss, alienation isolation, is also something of a counterbalance to an extreme outward turning set in train by distancing and objectivising technologies. The human being having no nature that can be simply found must make itself. The ‘I’ unavoidably separate, particular, takes on a free-floating condition. Baudelaire speaks of “un kaleidoscope doué de conscience, qui, à chacun de ses mouvements, représente la vie multiple et la grâce mouvante de tous les éléments de la vie. C’est un moi insatiable du non-moi.” Ruskin poses the multiple shaft as image of the individual soul:

The idea of the shaft remains absolutely single in the Roman and Byzantine mind: but true grouping begins in Christian architecture by the placing of two or more separate shafts side by side, each having its work to do; then three or four, still with separate work; then by such step as those above theoretically pursued, the number of the members increases, while they coagulate into a single mass; and we have finally a shaft apparently composed of thirty, forty, or more distinct members a shaft which, in the reality of its service, is as much a single shaft as the old Egyptian one; but which differs from the Egyptian in that all its members, how many soever, have each individual work to do, and a separate rib of arch or roof to carry; and thus the great Christian truth of distinct services of the individual soul is typified in the Christian shaft; and the old Egyptian servitude of the multitudes, the servitude inseparable from the children of Ham, is typified also in that ancient shaft of the Egyptians. (Ruskin, 10.VIII §xxv)

But it is perhaps a small step from multiple and particularized shaft to multiple and particularized soul; even within Ruskin’s life, if the disintegration of his own mind from 1877 onwards may be considered here.

In his dissection of the nineteenth century subject Bodei notes, “The I becomes all the more rarified and its voice all the more extraneous as it approaches its presumed nucleus... The path of consciousness of oneself through oneself is blocked... The circle of perfect identity of I=I does not close because the Other is already in the I, because, rather, the I is a simple phenomenon of the Other. Behind the evidence of the cogito there is only an echo, which repeats in a timbre not its own I, I, I...” (Bodei, p 217) “Je est un autre” Rimbaud would recognise in his Letter to George Izambard dated 13 May 1871. The ineradicable complement to the identity formed from process, from the self-reference which keeps opening itself every time in the search of a higher ‘satisfaction’, is Alterity. (Bodei, p 219) Self dispossession and self effacement become a strategy, the erasure of the individual, of the author, an emptying, a sort of secular kenosis. Rimbaud’s programmatic explanation, as Agamben argues, “must be taken literally: the redemption of objects is impossible except by virtue of becoming an object.” With Mallarmée both author and thing depicted will vanish. The greyness and loss of brightly distinguished medieval clothing that Ruskin laments will become for Loos the very mask supposed to guarantee identity.

6.

The elevation of the particular meant also a loss of hierarchy and assurance that any personal experience could be generalized. Type as a concept no longer necessarily organized particulars. In early Romanticism the part could stand for the whole, the universal be perceived in the particular; there was a synthesis of sign and thing. Absence of the general now became a prison or paralysis, conducive to insanity and suicide. Even for Ruskin the preoccupation with detail, such as the German and Flemish Schools showed, was a matter of morbidity. Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy reveals a horror of fragmentation and the merely particular. As governing forces they were the threat of dissolution. The accidental was a danger. For Engels the crowd shattered the relation of the individual to any hierarchical whole:

And however much one may be aware that this isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking is the fundamental principle, in our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as here in the crowding of the great city. The dissolution into monads of which each one has a separate principle, into the world of atoms, is here carried out to its utmost extreme.

Coherence is never guaranteed, least of all where the transformation of the crafted object into the mass-produced article manifests the loss of self-possession with respect to things. The coherence of the individual is caught in a process of splitting and pulverization:

We have much studied and much perfected, of late, the great civilized invention of the division of labour; only we give it a false name. It is not truly speaking the labour that is divided, but the men- Divided into mere segments of men - broken into small fragments and crumbs of life (Ruskin, 10.196)
fig 10 (top left) Tracery Bars
fig 11 (top right) Plans of Piers
fig 12 (bottom) The Lagoon at night
In the work of the Pre-Raphaelites, as in the way Ruskin reads a building, the fullness of presentation of each detail in its very clarity - its Naturalism - creates an unnatural vision, where everything is crowded into focus without peripheral relief. Each detail threatens to fall apart and demand individual explication. But this itself sets to work the energy of the particular. Particularity becomes an active principle that reunites subjectivity and world in the vital force of its own identities, creating identification between individual and individuated matter through painstaking accuracy.

Unlike an a priori system of ideal forms the particular is no guarantor of meaning; there is always the possibility that the presentation of the fortuitousness and neutrality of phenomena may threaten a barenness or impenetrability. The particular exists outside of any systems of difference or dialectic. Outside of order, relation and meaning. That is its danger. How much unclassifiable difference can be accepted before instability, insanity? “‘I’ is an unavoidable declaration of independence, of separateness, of particularity” (Ong, p 33) Architecture as the art of ordering, finds itself in an unstable situation when menaced by this particular, it is the accidental, what befalls.

“Taken in itself,” writes Blanchot of the fragment in relation to aphoristic poetry, “it is true, it appears with its sharp edges and broken character like a block to which nothing seems able to attach. A piece of meteor detached from an unknown sky and impossible to connect with anything that can be known.”

Alberti observed that what the philosophers termed accidents are such as to be known only by comparison - a relativism which classical thinking surmounted by the insertion of man as the measure and scale of all things. Ruskin knows no such measure or scale, for him structure in terms of completeness, grammatical interrelation and sufficiency of part and whole is irrelevant, “the whole is inconceivable” (Ruskin, 1.II §xxxii.) Classification by typology on the scientific or pattern book model provides hope of stability: Ruskin’s compilations and tabulations of minute measurements and profiles, garnered from hours spent daily clambering over Venetian buildings, suggest the reassurance of sufficient enumeration, should there be no end in sight -sheer busyness, the energy of the particular, is its own justification. The Platonic notion of multiplicity or diversity within an implied wholeness, the particular as token of divine abundance is probably Ruskin’s commonest recourse. But classification shatters before the wonder of limitlessness: “Infinity of infinities in the sum of possible change” (Ruskin, 9.142). If the whole is inconceivable, then there is always an inbuilt lack. Putting it another way, it is the lack that is filled by particulars, by ornament.

7.

It is where Ruskin approaches this heart of darkness, the lagoon in its indistinguishable mud and blackness, that it is sensed that the horror, the horror vacui, from which stems the excess which is the particular, is an effect of lack, lacuna:

The scene is often profoundly oppressive, even at this day... but, in order to know what it was once, let the traveler follow in his boat at evening the windings of some unfrequented channel far into the midst of the melancholy plain; let him remove, in his imagination, the brightness of the great city that still extends itself in the distance, and the walls and towers from the islands that are near; and wait until the bright investiture and sweet warmth of the sunset are withdrawn from the waters, and the black desert of their shore lies in its nakedness beneath the night, pathless, comfortless, infirm, lost in the dark languor and fearful silence, except where the salt runlets splash into the tideless pools, or the sea-birds flit from their margins with a questioning cry; and he will be enabled to enter in some sort into the horror of heart with which this solitude was anciently chosen by man for his habitation. (Ruskin, 10.13)

“We must remember” argues Roberto Masiero “that decoration is the response to the horror vacui, to the fear of the void, which is by its very nature the horror of solitude, a horror that the decay of communication would start, the thought that between the ‘one’ and the ‘others’ there is no longer anything to say.” Ornament has always presupposed the manifestation of social identity and a certain repression: “We speak we write, we decorate because something is missing. Social relations are constructed where instinct is inhibited - instinctive desire does not allow repression except in the definition of behavior intended to prevent it, social behavior.” (Masiero, p 21) The slave cannot immediately negate in pleasurable consumption, but be can only work upon ‘elaborate’ (bearbeiten) which consists in inhibiting (hemmen), in hemming his desire, in delaying the disappearance of the thing. The link between ornament and the unconscious, with subjective phantasy has been explored by Rae Beth Gordon, who argues that “the event - the disruptive event of the unconscious cannot be
fig 13 Lily Capital of St Mark's (Volume II, Plate IX)
removed from the empty space left by repression. This is why ornament, circumscribing and defining the void, itself situated in the “empty space” of peripheral perception is most apt to figure desire. In the first case (circumscription of the void) ornamental patterns are a symbol of unconscious desire that is characterised by lack.”62 Psychology and the theory of ornament develop together.

8.

The poles of the solitary, utter solitude, solipsism even, and “the world’s multitudinousness” are connected by the motif of the maze and labyrinth, the restless linear twining of particular to particular, and subject to particular.

It is that strange disquietude of the Gothic spirit that is its greatness; that restlessness of the dreaming mind, that wanders hither and thither among the niches, and flickers feverishly around the pinnacles, and frets and fades in labyrinthine knots and shadows along the wall and roof, and yet is not satisfied, nor shall be satisfied. The Greek could stay in his triglyph furrow and be at peace; but the work of the Gothic heart is fretwork still, and it can neither rest in nor from, its labour, but must pass on sleeplessly, until its love of change shall be pacified for ever in the change that must come alike on them that wake and them that sleep. (Ruskin, 10.214)

In the early 1850’s the experience of entanglement is untroubled,

the joy that the human mind has in contemplating any kind of maze or entanglement, so long as it can discern, through its confusion, any guiding clue or connecting plan. (Ruskin, 10.163)

The labyrinth of Venice is provided with white marble threads. (Ruskin, 10.296) It is like a mind and The Stones of Venice is a “kind of urban autobiography of consciousness”.63 Later, things will not be so simple:

the labyrinth of black walls, the loathsome passages between them, which now fills the valley of the Thames and is called London. (Ruskin, 21.104)

The labyrinth of life itself, and its interwoven occupation becomes too manifold, and too difficult for me (Ruskin, 22.452)

One great part of pleasure, depended on an idiosyncrasy which extremely wise people do not share - my love of all sorts of filigree and embroidery, from hoarfrost to the high clouds. The intricacies of virgin silver, of arboreous gold, the weaving of birds-nests, the netting of lace, the basket capitals of Byzantium, and most of all the tabernacle work of the French flamboyent school, possessed from the first, and possesses still, a charm for me of which the force was entirely unbroken for ten years after the first sight of Rouen... (Ruskin, 35.157, n 3)

The conjunction of fragment and entanglement began with Schlegel who affirmed that “Many works of the ancients have become fragments, and many works of the moderns are fragments at their birth.” The arabesque reproduces life’s endlessly varied profusion (Fülle), and its chaos. Schlegel thought that only the fragment could transcend the limit to which every finite work was subject, while the arabesque for him conforms is an endless series of digressions or offshoots -the very form of open-ended self-engendering form that Ruskin calls for. Changefulness, movement and metamorphosis in ornament, often so highly praised is paralleled by unconscious thought process.64

Ruskin’s text itself moves in such offshoots and digressions, meandering, returning upon itself. Digression becomes a mode of presentation. It is the literary equivalent of ornament, though, as with Ruskin’s understanding of ornament in relation to architecture, the apparent evasion often forms the “central” thought. The Stones of Venice is itself a digression from The Modern Painters. The Modern Painters an “explanation of a footnote” in The Stones of Venice (Ruskin, 10. xlvi)65. Only in section four of the second book, after skirting the outer islands and after a final diversion into an English cathedral town are we ready for the first sight of St. Marks. But first the passage by way of “a paved alley some seven feet wide” whose very compression crushes the narrative to a string of particles at first mundane (so much so his father feared he was mimicking Dickens), then at last the itemization of the “treasure-heap” in all its(Ruskin, 10.82-3) specifics of mythic symbolism, colour, variagation, entwined organic form. It is a vision devoid of breadth and the mastery attained by panopticism or the comprehension of a totality by plan. Jay Fellows (Fellows, Ruskin’s Maze p 53) contrasts Ruskin with Newman’s synthetic, synoptic, panoramic, centralizing intellect: “I say then, if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend; we must gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method...”66 He then mounts above it, reconnoitring the neighbourhood. “When he is without either map or prior topographical knowledge, Newman is irritated by complex specificity. He takes no pleasure in exploration. To explore is to be more lost than found. And losing his way in
fallen intricacy Newman loses control of potential synthesis and generalization." (Fellows, Ruskin's Maze p 178)

Understanding for Ruskin is like the traveler's, necessarily partial and progressive; he associates the modern taste for travel and the picturesque not only with actual travel but also with a certain restlessness characteristic of the modern temper. His suspicion of composition is of "that false composition which can be taught on principles." (Ruskin, 10.VI §xlii) The Stones' own compositional heterogeneity perhaps reflects this even as it tries to teach principles. The first book consists of short history and an immense list of parts; the second, a circuitous arrival at St. Marks, a list of Gothic elements, the Doge's palace and other palaces; the third, the Renaissance, the extraordinarily convoluted and difficult distinctions within the grotesque and its recuperation, finally, a self-confessed "rambling" supplement as conclusion.

9.

The Renaissance spirit is suspect for its complete confidence in its own wisdom: its mastery of space by perspective and of detail by the certainty of the orders; both efface the specific and guarantee mechanical reproducibility. The grotesque for Ruskin is a rupture in this rationality, a lacerating intrusion of the sublime, with its necessary distortions, into the world of discursive thought and polished finish. "This most curious and subtle character" is a category deferred till the end from "The Nature of Gothic" concerned with the ludicrous and the fearful: the terror of evil but above all of death (Ruskin, 11.III §lxv). The mind under certain phases of excitement, plays with terror, and summons images which, if it were in another temper, would be awful, but of which, either in weariness or in irony, it refrains for the time to acknowledge the true terribleness. And the mode in which the refusal takes place distinguishes the nobile from the ignoble grotesque. For the master of the noble grotesque knows the depth of all at which he seems to mock, and would feel it at another time, or feels it in a certain undercurrent of thought even while he jests with it. (Ruskin, 11.III §xl)

Characteristically he digresses in footnote into the necessity of madness, the criticism of system, and the conceit of the "I" in the case of a German philosopher-artist: "but I think that among the first persons, no emphasis is altogether so strong as that on the German Ich." By contrast "the truly great" is he who "ays his head in the dust and speaks thence -often in broken syllables." (Ruskin, 11.III §lx note)

In effect it is the smooth finish of discursive rationality itself which enslaves, in its refusal as Bataille will say, to risk the death of meaning.

A fine grotesque is the expression, in a moment, by a series of symbols, thrown together in bold and fearless connection of truths which it would have taken a long time to express in any verbal way, and of which the connection is left for the beholder to work out for himself; the gaps, left or overleaped by the haste of the imagination, forming the grotesque character. (Ruskin, 5.132)

The valorization of this speaking "in broken syllables", of "shattered majesty", of the scattered, the unfinished, the particular not simply in the negative or in terms of nostalgic or picturesque values makes Ruskin (often despite his intentions) the first architectural theorist of particularity, and its negotiation between mastery and servitude.

10.

Virtually a century after The Stones of Venice, the Venice School again raised the question of the particular. Saverio Muratori having drawn up an "oparant history" whose minutely detailed maps trace Venice down to the level of showing every individual room, presents in the concept of building type something which is, nevertheless, thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of Hegelian totalisation. Aldo Rossi's perpetuation of this move of typology towards structuralism, would later be posed in the clearest of oppositional polarities. Only Carlo Scarpa's works in their palimpsest and mosaic-like assemblage of particulars eluded the trap. Writing on his work Manfredo Tafuri will cite Blanchot on the scattered archipelago of René Char's words. Need one now remark that writing on this archipelago-city Ruskin had already said as much?

The scattered is the lack of a common measure. The Ruskinian particular is menaced from two sides: by meaninglessness - empty, blind chance and by endless susceptibility to exegesis - unrelieved
relevance where apparently negligible details could reveal through detective work profound phenomena of great importance (invisible to contemporary Venetians though right under their noses) but overdetermined, all chance removed, the paranoiac state where everything is relevant. Ruskin is programmatically committed to the recollection of Venice brought into omnipresent unity, a world of detail without fragments where the detail will always be able to interpret and reconstitute the overall schema. If St Marks is a “vast illuminated missal” then The Stones itself aspires to something of that all-embracing proto-structuralism which is the the nineteenth century project of “The Book” in Mallarmée, in Flaubert and in Viollet-le-Duc, to the aspiration to mastery. But Ruskin is philosophically committed to the unfinished, the fragment, the intrinsic, the particular. And, as the Schoolmen already knew, individuum est ineffabile, what is individual cannot be spoken about (Ginzburg, p 171), except, one is tempted to add, “in broken syllables…”

2 The continuity of this tradition is argued by George Hersey, *The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture*, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989)
3 “The one idea which appears to underlie all human and animal figures used to support architectural members is service. This may be the service of a slave, of a servit, or simply of a servant.” Michael Vickers, “Persepolis, Vitruvius and the Erechtheum Caryatids: The Iconography of Medism and Servitude,” *Revue Archéologique* 1, (1985): 16
4 John Unrau, for example, provides a list of works critical of Ruskin on these counts and then proceeds further to attempt to measure against the historical facts of medieval practice and working conditions. John Unrau “Ruskin, the Workman and the Savageess of Gothic,” *New Approaches to Ruskin*, Thirteen Essays, ed. Robert Hewson, (London: Boston & Henley, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
5 “Let us, therefore, at once confine the name to that art which, taking up and admitting, as conditions of its working, the necessities and common uses of the building, impresses on its form certain characters venerable or beautiful, but otherwise unnecessary. Thus I suppose, no one would call the laws architectural which determine the height of a breastwork or the position of a bastion. But in the stone facing of that bastion be added an unnecessary feature, as a feature moulding, that is architecture.” John Ruskin “The Lamp of Sacrifice,” *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, (London: J M Dent, 1963) p. 8.
6 For Loos of course the very absence of ornament, in a certain symmetry to Ruskin, will define architecture in an absence of practical use: “When, crossing a wood, one comes across a tumulus six feet long and three feet wide, raised by shovels in the form of a pyramid, we become serious, and something in us says: That is architecture…” Adolf Loos “Architektur” *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. *Gluck von Franz* (Vienna: Herold 1962) p. 317.
8 “Hence then a general law, of singular importance in the present day, a law of simple common sense, - not to decorate things belonging to purposes of active and occupied life. Wherever you can rest, there decorate; where rest is forbidden, so is beauty. You must not mix ornament with business, any more than you can mix play. Work first, and then rest. Work first then grieve, but do not use golden ploughshares, nor bind ledgers in enamel.” (Ruskin, Seven Lamps §6)
9 “Ornament... has two entirely distinct sources of agreeableness, one that of the abstract beauty of forms, which, for the present, we will suppose to be the same whether they come from the hand or the machine; the other the sense of human labour and care spent upon it. How great this latter influence we may perhaps judge, by considering that there is not a cluster of weeds growing in any cranny of ruin which has not a beauty in all respects nearly as equal and in some immeasurably superior, to that of the most elaborate sculpture of stones [...] and that our interest in the carved work, our sense of its richness, though it is tenfold less rich than the knots of grass beside it, of its delicacy, though it is a thousandfold less delicate...results from our consciousness of it being the work of poor, clumsy, toilsome man” (Ruskin, Seven Lamps, pp. 81-2)
10 The gospel of work is also doubt to be seen in the light of Carlyle’s Past and Present: “All work even cotton-spinning is noble, work is alone noble” Thomas Carlyle *The complete works of Thomas Carlyle* (New York: Crowthorne 1902) v. 10, p. 153
11 “§31 Law II. Science of inner structure is to be abandoned.” (Ruskin, 10. 99)
12 The practice of gathering precious marbles and slicing them thinly which arose at first out of necessity was, he argues, “prolonged in the pride of the conquering one: and besides the memorials of departed happiness, were elevated the trophies of returning victory. The ship of war brought home more marble in triumph than the merchant vessel in speculation.” (Ruskin, 10. 97)
13 Thus of the colours of marble: “There is a history in them. By the manner in which they are arranged in every piece of marble, they record the means by which that marble has been produced, and the successive changes through which it has passed. And in all their veins and zones, and flame-like stainings, or broken and disconnected lines, they write various legends, never untrue, of the former political state of the mountain kingdom to which they belonged, of its infinities and fortitudes, convulsions and consolidations, from the beginning of time.” (Ruskin, 11. 38)
14 As Joseph Rykwert notes it was nature that “Ruskin continually scrutinized for the way in which surface revealed structure, and the structure the process of making...Ruskin was a naturalist: he was of Darwin’s generation and intellectual
14 It is only from this sense of materials in their "peculiar class," and "higher principles of action" that "the languages of
Types" will be read. (Ruskin, 11. 41)
15 "All art which is worth its room in the world...is art which proceeds from an individual mind, working through instruments
which assist, but do not supersede, the muscular action of the human hand, upon the materials which most tenderly receive,
and most securely retain, the impression of such human labour.
16 See the celebrated contrast (in Pugin's sense) between the Renaissance and Romanesque Wall-Veil Decoration (Ruskin, plate
XIII facing 9. 348)
17 "European man has become free, master of himself and lord of the world precisely because he has renounced the fear of
alterity, contradiction and the unknown, because he has been passing through them practically at their own height, thinking
them and joining thus to the complete unification, in a figure, of the universal and of the individual."
18 Georg Wilhelm Friedric
Englika apatie der philosophischen in grundrisse (Berlin: L. Heiman 1870) §2262.
19 See also: John Forrester (New York: WW Norton 1988)
20 "This slavery is done away with altogether; Christianity having recognised in small things as well as great the individual
value of every soul. But it not only recognises its value, it confesses its imperfection, in only bestowing dignity upon the
whole."
21 "Europe has been passing through them practically at their own height, thinking them and joining thus to the complete
unification, in a figure, of the universal and of the individual."
22 "The third kind of ornament, the Renaissance is that in which the inferior detail becomes principal, the executor of every
minor portion being required to exhibit skill and possess knowledge as great as that which is possessed by the master of the
design; in the endeavour to endow him with this skill and knowledge, his own original power is overwhelmed, and the whole
minor becomes a wearisome exhibition of well-educated imbecility." (Ruskin, 10. 189)
23 "Savageness" see Patrick Connors, Savage Ruskin, (London: MacMillan, 1979) pp. 98-100, and Wendell V. Harris, "The
24 "Independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. trans A.V.
See also:
Georges Bataille, L'experience interieure, (Paris: Gallimard, 1954) Inner Experience, trans Anne Leslie (Bolted State University of
New York Press, 1988)
Maurice Blanchot, "Literature and the Right to Death" The Gaze of Orpheus and Other Essays, trans Lydia Davis (New York:
Station Hill 1981)
Jean Paul Sartre L'être et le néant: essai d'ontologie phénoménologique (Paris: Gallimard 1949)
XXVIII, pp. 222-23
pp. 251-77
25 I do not intend to suggest any direct links between Ruskin and Hegel, though see Robert Hewison John Ruskin: the argument
of the eye (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press c1976) pp. 204-204 for speculations on this account, in particular
those of R.G. Collingwood and his father.
26 Jean Hypolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans S. Cheriak and J. Heckman (Genèse et structure de
abbreviation of Hegel is derived from Hypolite's summary.
27 Kojève comments: "The opposition of Particularity and Universality of Einzelheit and Allgemeinheit, is fundamental for
Hegel" (Kojève, p. 58) and elaborates: "Mastery corresponds to Universality and Slavery to the particular...The human value
constituted by work is essentially particular, 'personal.' Bildung, the educative formation of the worker by Work, depends on
the concrete conditions in which the work is carried out, conditions that vary in space and are modified in time as a function of
this very work. Therefore it is by Work, finally, that the differences between men are established, that the 'particularities,' the
'personalities,' are formed. And thus it is the working Slave, and not the Master, who becomes conscious of his 'personality'
and who imagines 'individualistic' ideologies, in which absolute value is attributed to particularity, to 'personality.'" (Kojève,
pp. 59-60)
28 Yves Michaud, "L'art auquel on ne fait pas attention (à propos de Gombrich)" [review of The Sense of Order] Critique
XXVIII No.416, (January 1982): 29, 30

This individuation is expressed by the hand:

“That the hand, however, must represent in its self the individuality in respect of its fate is easy to see from the fact that, next to the organ of speech, it is the hand most of all by which a man manifests and actualizes himself. It is the living artificer of his fortune. We may say of the hand that it is what a man does, for in it, as the active organ of his self fulfiment, he is present as the animating soul and since he is primarily his own fate, his hand will thus express this in itself.”

(Hegel, Phenomenology §314, p. 189)

30 For Hegel difference is at once manifested and absorbed in the moment which resolves it. He cannot think difference in terms of diversity only opposition. Difference is made contradiction. [Cf Francoise Collin, Maurice Blanchot et la question de l’écriture, (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) p. 202-3] The other of something is never an other but its other. What differs from difference is identity which Blanchot parodies thus: “What differs from difference is difference” quoted (Collin, p. 203 n. 2. “For Hegel a thing does not have an other, nor its other, nor others, but is of the other, art is other. It is not particular, and is not inscribed from hence in the movement of the universal: it is always already anonymous,” (Collin, p. 204)

31 Ruskin’s emphasis. This paragraph begins: “The especial condition of true ornament, is that it be beautiful in its place, and nowhere else, and that it aid the effect of every portion of the building over which it has influence; that it does not by its richness make other parts bald, or by its delicacy, make other parts coarse.” (Ruskin, 9.284)

32 Cf Ignasi de Sola-Morales Rubid: “What is decorative is inessential, it is that which appears not as substance but as background, something which allows a reading, in the style of Walter Benjamin, which is not attentive but distracted and, as such, becomes something that highlights and enriches reality and makes it bearable, without attempting to dominate, to become central, to demand the respect due to the totality.” Ignasi de Sola-Morales Rubid “Arquitectura Debil,” Quaderns 175, (1987) 83-4.

33 “Directly opposed to this ordered, disciplined, well officered, and variously ranked ornament, this type of divine, and therefore of all good human government, is the democratic ornament, in which all is equally influential, and has equal office and authority: that is to say, none of it any office or authority, but a life of continual struggle for independence and notoriety, or of gambling for chance regards. The English perpendicular work is by far the worst of this kind that I know.” (Ruskin, 9.302-303). The military metaphors in relation to ornament are again taken up in 10.308.

For Ruskin a false idea of liberty had supplanted the old values of loyalty and obedience resulting in the “horror, distress and tumult which oppress foreign nations”, the revolutions of 1848.

34 It comprises the following:

(1.) Abstract lines.
(2.) Forms of Earth (Crystals).
(3.) Forms of Water (Waves).
(4.) Forms of Fire (Flames and Rays).
(5.) Forms of Air (Clouds).
(6.) (Organic forms). Shells.
(7.) Fish.
(8.) Reptiles and Insects.
(9.) Vegetation (A). Stems and Trunks.
(10.) Vegetation (B). Foliage.
(11.) Birds.
(12.) Mammalian animals and Man.

35 Ruskin wrote to his father February 1852 that the essence of Gothic lies “in the workman’s heart and mind - but its outward distinctive test is the trefoiled arch... I shall show that the Distinctive test of Gothic architecture is so by a mysterious ordainment, being first a type of the Trinity in unity, Secondly of all the beauty of Vegetation upon earth - which was what man was intended to express his love of, even when he built in stone - lastly because it is the perfect expression of the strongest possible way of building an arch.” Ruskin’s Letters from Venice 1851-1852, ed J.L. Bradley, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) p. 192, see also Jeffrey L. Spear, Dreams of an English Eden: Ruskin and his tradition in social criticism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) p. 115. Spear notes how Ruskin conducts most of his analyses in triplets.

With specific reference to The Stones of Venice one may note: Three books, three “orders”, three cities: Tyre, Venice London, three elements: Roman, Lombard, and Arab, three virtues: required of a building: that it act well, speak well, look well, three classes of artistic qualifications, the foxglove in three stages.

36 For Ruskin’s opposition to a theory of pure form, such as that of Ralph Wornum, see E.H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979) p. 38.


39 “Greatness can only be rightly estimated when minuteness is rightly reverenced. Greatness is the aggregation of minuteness; nor can its sublimity be felt truthfully by any mind unaccustomed to the affectionate watching of what is least.” (Ruskin, 7.230)

40 “This phenomenology which admittedly describes the diverse figures of human consciousness and knowledge, is nevertheless a clearly phenomenal manifestation of the Absolute - that is, of what Hegel calls in his preface, the ‘life of God’ or the ‘life of the Spirit,’ by which he means the life of the trinitarian Spirit that ‘endures [death] and maintains itself in it.’ In this sense, Hegel’s Phenomenology is the speculative version of the Passion (as Bataille, rectifying Kojeve, understood perfectly): the Absolute that ‘tends’ itself in is self-negation is strictly modelled on the kenosis of Christ (Saint Paul, Philippians 2:7: Christ ‘emptied himself [ekenosen], taking the form of a servant’). We might as well say that this death is inseparable from the resurrection. There is in Hegel an incarnation of the Absolute (human manifestation, finite phenomenal), but this
incarnation remains that of the Spirit that 'maintains itself even in death' and thus 'changes nothingness into being.' The fact that man (the 'Son of Man') dies is no problem for Hegel, since this death of the finite man is precisely the motive force behind his infinite 'sublation' (Aufhebung), the condition of the Spirit's finally absolute manifestation as trinitarian identity of Father and Son, of Substance and subject, of the in-itself and the for-itself, of identity and difference: 'That Substance is essentially Subject is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as Spirit - the most sublime Concept and the one which belongs to the modern age and its religion' - Michael Borch Jakobsen, *Lazar The Absolute Master*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press 1999) pp. 12-13.

41 9,291 §13


"Hegel is interested not so much in the defence of differentiation or the interiority of the individual (which for him still preserved the mark of feudal particularization or of youthful enthusiasm) as much as their connection with reality, in the construction of rational and anonymous ties, which being incarnated in the laws and institutions and becoming second nature would have had to make a rationality living in the real and drastically diminish the weight of individual arbitrariness, from the monarchy to the last citizen." (Bodei, p. 212-5)

44 William Shakespeare *Measure for Measure* II.iii.ii

45 See also (Fellows, *Falling distance* p38)


47 "Five orders! There is not a side chapel in any Gothic cathedral but it has fifty orders, the worst of them better than the best of the Greek ones, and all new; and a single inventive human soul could create a thousand orders in an hour" (Ruskin, 11. Ilxxvi)


50 Apart from the more obvious similarities of subject matter and, at times, of technique in their drawings, there is similar valorization and minute observation of the particularities of nature and self. ["Throughout his life Hopkins filled his journals with comments on Ruskin's aesthetic laws, artless pronouncements on the superiority of Gothic architecture above all others, as Ruskin says* (The Journals and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed Humphry House and Graham Stow, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959) p. 13) and admonitions to himself and others to follow Ruskin's advice." (Sulloway, p 41-2)] These themes will be developed and be carried to an extreme pitch. In Hopkins is to be found the striking conjunction of self-denial, self-sacrifice the the wrestling with an inner void or abyss of the self, even as he speaks of the "taste of the self". "What is man says Job that Thou shouldst contend with him? Yet as in Job, we feel the calling more than the being called - a voice constraining the void. The true contender is man who cries for justice. So Hopkins who strains ears and eyes to transform the not yet into the now" like a lighted empty hall where stands no host at door or hearth vacant creation's lamps appall ("Nondum")

The more he packs his verse the more we sense his Pascalian horror at that vacancy. 'Verily Thou art a God that hidest Thyself' . "(Poetry and Justification" Hopkins A Collection of Critical Essays ed by Geoffrey H. Hartman, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1966) pp. 6-7.)

J.Hillis Miller ("Creation of Self in Hopkins" *Victorian Subjects*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p. 4) notes "What had seemed so solid (the self) turns out to be merely a 'positive infinitesimal' (The Notebooks and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London and New York: Oxford University Press 1937) p. 322). What had seemed so self-subsistent is really very much like the Mallarméan nothing: it is 'nothing a zero, in the score or account of existence'"

Here too a horror vacui ["(Hopkins will use word on word, image on image, as if possessed with a poetic kind of horror vacui." ("The Dialectic of Sense-Perception", ed Geoffrey H Hartman *Hopkins: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1966), p117] is set in contention with an inexhaustible resilience, multiplicity, differentiation, and individuation of things:

Each mortal thing does one thing and the same--:

Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;

Selves -goes itself, itself it speaks and spells

Crying What I do is me: for that I came.

Each thing in nature has its own distinctive note or tone, is "arch-espécial". Hopkins related his own notions of individuation in his terms "inscape" and "instress" to the principium individuationis of Duns Scotus in the medieval philosopher's concept of haecceitas, the ultimate individuality of a thing. For Scotus every individual entity is radically different from any other entity. For Plato and Aristotle individual things or men are feeble incarnations of the species. The individual's greater richness of perfection is in contrast to the species and the ultimate perfection of things, it enables them to receive in themselves the act of existence. Multiplication of individuality is seen as a communication of divine goodness and beatitude, see Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of his Philosophy*, trans and ed Bernadine Bonansese, (Washington DC, Washington: Catholic University of America Press 1961) haecceitas for Scotus is the positive ultima realitas entis (Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Christopher Devlin, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959) p 380) Fr Devlin (Hopkins, Sermons, p 293) notes that Hopkins "identifies 'inscape' with 'nature' as distinct from 'pitch', which is identified with haecceitas."

Hopkins uses the expression 'pitches of suchness.'

See also Walter J Ong, 'Particularity and Self in Hopkins' Victorian Consciousness' *Hopkins, the Self and God*, (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press,1986) pp. 1-46
Each thing has the energy of being "throughout one with itself" and each is distinctive in pattern. [Hopkins, Journals p.130.]

"Inscap" refers to "species or individually distinctive beauty of style" ("Letter to Coventry Patmore", Hopkins, Journals p. 373).

According to Scotus what distinguishes individual of a species from all other individuals cannot be explained in terms of matter or form or essence or quantity or even by existence, but is simply given with the individual itself, the being's 'thiness', haecceitas [See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy (London: Burns Oates Washbourne 1946) vol 2, pp. 234-40.]

My selfbeing, my consciousness and feeling of myself that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnut leaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man. (Hopkins, Journals p 123)

Hopkins' notion of "piedness" like rhyme and beauty is a relation between things which are similar without being identical, each thing deriving its peculiar existence, its "inscap" from a unique interlocking or interweaving or coincidence of characteristics, a "chiming" of words that founds difference of sense on identity of sounds: "All beauty may by a metaphor be called rhyme." (Hopkins, Journals p 102)

Hopkins' presentation in the colloquial, vernacular, local, the acute detail indicate how he must begin with the individual "for he is confronted at the beginning with a world of realities and particulars," (J. Hills, Miller Disappearance of God, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975) pp. 276-7) harmony is reached by way of rhyme where "any two things however unlike are in something like." (Hopkins, Journals p 123) "For Hopkins Form is eccentric, realist, differential" (Michael Sprinkler, A Counterpoint of Dissonance The Aesthetics and Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) p 24)

"Form does not originate in the imposition of structure on a series of diverse elements, but in the spontaneous generation of similarity out of difference. As Giles Deleuze puts it, 'seul co qui se ressemble diffère, seules les différences se ressemblent'. Form does not radiate from a centre but arises spontaneously from the comparison and differentiation of separate and distinctive parts within the whole." (Sprinkler, p25)

"There are indeed two texts in Hopkins, the over thought and the under thought. One text, the overthought is a version... of western metaphysics in its catholic Christian form. in this text the word governs all words, as it governs natural objects and selves... On the other hand the under thought, if it is followed out is a thought about language itself. It recognises that there is no word for the word, that all words are metaphors - that is, all are differentiated, differed, deferred. Each leads to something of which it is the displacement in a movement without origin or end, in so far as the play of language emerges as the basic model for the other two realms (nature and the effects of grace within the soul), it subverts both nature and supernatural. The individual natural object and the individual self, by the fact of their individuality, are incapable of ever being more than a metaphor of Christ - that is, split off from Christ." (Hilli Miller, The Linguistical Moment in 'The Wreck of the Deutschland' New Criticism and After ed Thomas Daniel Young, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976) p 58)

At the deepest centre of selfhood each is altogether alone, what Hopkins the "inscap" of the individualized being moves outwards by its "instress" to be registered by consciousness [Hence his reflections on the term 'sake']. "Sake is word I find it convenient to use: I did not know when I did so first that it is common in German in the form of each. It is the sake of or for the sake of, foresake, namesake, keepsake. I mean by it the being of a thing, has outside itself, as a voice by its echo, a face by its reflection, a body by its shadow, a man by his name, fame or memory and also that in the thing by virtue of which it has this being abroad, and that is something distinctive, marked, specifically or individually speaking as for a voice and echo clearness; for a reflected image light, brightness; for a shadow-casting body, bulk; for a man genius, great achievements, amiability, and so on". Letter to Bridges 26 May 1879 The Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins to Robert Bridges (London: Oxford University Press 1935).

But there is neither a centre from which this happens nor a universal self. In his extraordinarily contorted commentary on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius (Hopkins, Sermons p 127), the self cannot be reduced to "a mere centre or point of reference for consciousness or action attributed to it." The concept of a universal self is revealed to be a contradiction in terms: the universal self 'is not really identified with everything else nor with anything else, which was supposed; that is / there is no such universal', as Sprinkler notes: "The despairing conclusion to the text, that there is no such universal partially conceals but is not entirely avoided the silent but inevitable conclusion of the text's inexorable logic: there is no such self either." (Sprinkler, p 86)


52 Hopkins is opposed to merging, where "all is seared with trade; smeared with toil/ And wears man's smudge" and "self in self" is "steeped and pashed" individuality and pattern are insufficiently distinctive to produce rhyme.

55 Engels "The Condition of the Working Class in 1844".


59 "to examine not only every one of the older palaces, stone by stone, but every fragment throughout the city which afforded any clue to the formation of its styles" (Ruskin, Preface, 9.10)
60 See also Tony Tanner, Venice Desired, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p. 86. The problem of modernism for Ruskin, as it will be for Foucault, is how to make it all come together.
61 Roberto Masiero, "In Praise of Decoration against Superficiality", Rassegna XII, 41/1 (March 1990) p. 23.
facolta individuante dai limiti stessi posti dal tipo formante, che viveva e mutava rimanendo sempre se stesso, affermando quindi una individualità sua propria, antecedente a legittimamente fondata sulla individualità base dell'edificio; mentre l'organismo urbano, a sua volta, si apriva a una vita individualità - e si identificava nell'ambiente urbano, come...

Aldo Rossi, 1990), p. 74

Both quotes are from Blanchot’s “The Gaze of Orphée,” p. 43. See also Andrzej Warminski, “Dreadful Reading Blanchot on Hegel” Readings in Interpretation, (Mnepolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) pp. 183-91

On the concept of building type he writes:

“Come origine energetica di un processo, agente in ogni senso, quindi insieme costruttivamente e funzionalmente, forma formante, che viveva e mutava rimanendo sempre se stesso, affermando quindi una individualità sua propria, antecedente a qualunque espressione individuale personale, che anzi ne diveniva la condizione e unica base di legittimità, costituendo dunque la sostanza dell’unità e della pienzza di una tecnica, intesa come applicazione economica, ma come attività umana completa, dunque come civiltà.” Saverio Muratori “Architettura e Civiltà in crisi,” 1963 Antologia critica degli scritti di Saverio Muratori, (Florence: Alinea, 1990), p.124.

“All’esterior esso costituiva un principio aggregativo altamente caratterizzato nel tessuto edilizio come parte integrante dell’organismo urbano, di cui diveniva condizione, ma anche stimolo qualificante di ulteriore individualità legittimamente fondata sulla individualità base del tipo edilizio; mentre l’organismo urbano, a sua volta, si apriva a vita nel tempo secondo una ulteriore affermazione individuale - condizionata e stimolata insieme dai gradi già acquistata di individualità - e si identificava nell’ambiente urbano, come unità nella continuità, rimanendo sempre pari a se stesso, a un tempo limite e principio di sviluppo attivo.

“All’interno il tipo edilizio si apriva a un ulteriore e continuo processo di individuazione nella caratterizzazione peculiare dell’edificio singolo, determinato da forze individuate - di luogo, di committente e di artista - agenti e innescate nella loro facoltà individuante dai limiti stessi posti dal tipo edilizio.” Antologia critica degli scritti di Saverio Muratori, (Florence, Alinea, 1990), p. 100.

On the first page of Rossi’s The Architecture of the City is to be read:

“The contrast between the particular and the universal, between individual and collective, emerges from the city and from its construction, its architecture. This contrast is one of the principal viewpoints from which the city will be studied in this book.” Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,1985), p. 21.

“One has to make the effort of identifying in the ’explosion’ or ‘disintegration’ a value that is not purely negative. And not privative or simply positive, either. It is as if the alternative and the compulsion to affirm the being when one wishes to deny it were split apart... So the fragmentary poem is not incomplete, but one which opens up a different mode of completion: that mode which comes into play in the form of expectancy, of questioning, or of an affirmation irreducible to unity.” Manfredo Tafuri, “Carlo Scarpa and Italian Architecture” Carlo Scarpa The Complete Works, ed Francesco Dal Co and Giuseppe Mazzariol, (New York: Electa/Rizzoli, 1985), p. 77

47 “the discontinuous form, according to Blanchot, is the only one that ‘weds speech and silence, play and serenity, the need for utterance and the uncertainty of wavering, troubled thought.” (Tafuri, p. 81)

Both quotes are from Blanchot’s Entrée Infini.